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Stacey Gutkowski. We are the very model of a moderate Muslim state? The 
Amman Messages and Jordan’s Foreign Policy, International Relations, 
30(2), 2016. 
 
Abstract. Despite its significance to one of the most problematic discursive binaries of the ‘War on 
Terror’, moderation has been a largely taken for granted theoretical and empirical category in the 
discipline of International Relations. To prompt further conversation, this article examines ‘Islamic 
moderation’ as part of Middle Eastern states’ nation branding in the decade and half since 9/11, using 
Jordan as a case study. I argue that while Jordan’s official and state-endorsed civil society efforts to 
promote ‘moderate Islam’ and interfaith dialogue stem in part from an authentic interest in promoting 
dialogue and peace, the Jordanian Hashemite regime has also used the Amman Messages to deepen 
political trust with the United States, attempting to instrumentalize the moral authority of religion as a 
form of state productive power. It has done so by playing on a myth of religious moderation which has 
resonated in both the Middle East and the West since 9/11. 
Keywords. Jordan, moderation, Amman Message, interfaith dialogue, political trust, nation branding, War on 
Terror. 
 
Introduction 
One of the most familiar yet problematic discursive tropes of the so-called War on 
Terror is the binary constructed between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ Muslims. But despite its 
recent discursive prominence, moderation has been a largely taken for granted category in the 
discipline of International Relations.
1
 Scholars outside IR, however, have recently begun to 
unpack it theoretically and empirically. Smith and Holmwood have sought to reclaim the 
‘elusive’ analytical category, suggesting that it is not merely banal centrism or the antithesis 
of extremism, but a rich and coherent category of political practice.
2
 Many scholars have 
stressed the normative, progressive, dialogic character of moderate political practice, its 
tendency towards ‘civility, dialogue, reflexivity and tolerance for opposing viewpoints’ and 
‘productive interactional practice’.3 However, regarding feminism, Roy has critiqued the 
ways in which the term ‘moderation’ is sometimes used to exalt, legitimize and discipline 
‘acceptable’ political practice. 4 What follows shares Roy’s critical impulse. 
This article takes up Smith and Holmwood’s call to unpack moderation empirically 
and theoretically. To prompt new lines of scholarly enquiry about this category in IR, it 
analyses ‘Islamic moderation’ as part of Middle Eastern states’ nation branding and use of 
‘culture as display’ in the decade and half since 9/11, using Jordan as a thick case study.5 
This dynamic has been particularly visible at global level in what has variously been called 
civilizational, intercultural, or interfaith dialogue, an arena of inter-governmental activity 
since 2000. This activity at state and inter-state level has attracted the attention of IR scholars 
in recent years.
6
 This article aims to bring that discussion into conversation with two other 
recent bodies of scholarship, on nation-branding and political trust, as well as deeper, critical 
engagement with the social construction of ‘moderation’. Moderation is a highly unstable 
category of practice, though it may seem stable, self-evident and unproblematic. The 
opportunities for theoretical advancement in IR go well beyond the context of Western 
relations with the Middle East (which is the more modest terrain in which this article sits) and 
the conclusion alludes to some possible directions for further enquiry. 
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I am fundamentally sceptical that there is any coherence to the categories ‘moderate’ 
and ‘radical’ in international politics. Lacking identifiable ‘content’, these are discursive 
markers used by actors to build alliances, send political signals to their constituencies, and 
elide normatively and politically problematic actions. There is no ‘basket of goods’ or traits, 
whereby we can determine an actor’s intentions or identity as ‘moderate’. Even nonviolence 
is not a reliable marker. Notably, while the term moderation has come to imply something 
progressive and nonviolent in contemporary colloquial usage, governmentality as well as 
violence are part of the ongoing genealogy of so-called ‘moderate’ practice. For example, 
historian Ethan Shagan has written with great insight of the ways in which robust governance 
in the early modern period in England was justified through a discourse of moderation. 
Shagan notes that moderation was articulated as a combination of the development of 
individual restraint with restraint by government, of state survival and the security of 
subjects. He sees in this period ‘a broad politics of restraint in which moderation was 
simultaneously the harmony that subjects sought and the hammer with which they forged it’. 
He calls this moderation’s ‘apparent paradox, the ability to hold coercion and harmony in 
suspension’.7 ‘Moderate’ and ‘radical’ and their cognates are labels – both self-claimed and 
endowed by others – which take on meaning only within social and political relationships.  
As Somer argues, what constitutes a moderate political position is always socially 
constructed as well as contextually dependent.
8
 What counts as political moderation in the 
Middle East is far from self-evident and Jordan is no exception. The term moderation has 
been used by actors in the Middle East alternately as a synonym for various related but not 
coterminous concepts including nonviolence, political pragmatism, social progressiveness, 
commitment to the democratic process, increased tolerance, pluralist norms, the ‘Arab 
Centre’ and alliance with the West.9 These do not mean the same things. For example, 
moderation in the Middle East should not be confused with Arab liberalism, though these 
terms are often used interchangeably by liberals themselves.
10
 Somer offers the term ‘centre’ 
as a more precise descriptor than moderation.
11
 In his view, what constitutes the political 
‘centre’ is not a fixed point but is determined by a dialectic process (moderation the verb, not 
the adjective) whereby groups adjust their claims to gain support. A range of actors in the 
Middle East claim the mantel of moderation when it suits them: socially liberal and socially 
conservative, progressive and reactionary, Western-sympathizers and those staunchly 
opposed. Still, while liberals attempt to claim the mantel of ‘moderation’ away from their 
Islamist competitors, particularly in their dealings with the West, it is not obvious that they 
can in fact claim it away from conservatives who participate peacefully in the democratic 
process and show what Schwedler has called ‘behavioural moderation’.12 Complicating 
matters further, Marwan Muasher, former Jordanian foreign minister and Jordan’s first 
ambassador to Israel, has suggested that Western states have identified Arab moderation with 
a single issue – a willingness to work constructively with the Israelis on the peace process. 
(One could say the say the same for security cooperation with the West.) He argues that states 
who cooperate on this one issue are deemed ‘moderate’ by the West despite immoderate 
authoritarian practices within their own borders.
13
  
Empirically, this article addresses Jordan’s Amman Messages and state-endorsed 
governmental and civil society interfaith efforts since 2004, based on fieldwork conducted in 
Amman, Jordan in the summer of 2013.
14
 I argue that while Jordan’s official and state-
endorsed civil society efforts to promote ‘moderate Islam’ stem in part from a seeming 
authentic interest in promoting dialogue and peace, the Jordanian Hashemite regime has also 
used the Amman Messages as a calling card to the West, a way to grease the wheels of 
increased security and political cooperation which has not always been popular with the 
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population. Several scholars have accepted the Messages as unproblematic attempts to 
counter post-9/11 clash of civilizations narratives at home and abroad.
15
 Few have critically 
unpacked the relationship between these initiatives and other Jordanian foreign policy 
objectives. An important exception to this oversight is Browers, who points to ‘the 
embeddedness of the Message[s] in domestic, regional and international political interests’.16 
She argues that the 2004 Message has allowed the regime to quell domestic dissent and take a 
visible stance against sectarianism in the region while also aligning Jordan with US interests 
during the War on Terror.
 17
 This article takes up this prompt. 
The US and Jordan have cooperated for decades based on realist calculations, and 
there are many material reasons why US-Jordanian political trust has deepened since 9/11. 
Still religion has played a subtle but noteworthy role in this deepening, due to the combined 
salience of Islam during the so-called War on Terror and the genealogical evolution of Euro-
American conceptions of religion as both private and irenic. In the wider context of the so-
called War on Terror, the US and its allies have developed a binary view of ‘moderate’ and 
‘radical’ Islam which relies on an overly narrow conception of what religion ‘is’, and 
designates actors as exclusively ‘moderate’ or ‘radical’ based on their willingness to support 
US security interests. This logic has in turn powerfully shaped how the US builds alliances 
and how other states have built alliances with it, requiring the performance of shared 
identities. 
While, as Poggi suggests, religion does indeed have the power to shape the political 
and economic spheres through its ability to compel human action through emotive moral 
appeal, the US and its allies have sought to instrumentalize this power.
18
 And the logic of the 
War on Terror – in which ‘radicals’ have been the recipient of an often deadly security 
response while ‘moderates’ have often reaped benefits – has incentivized many actors to 
portray themselves as Islamic ‘moderates’ in the overly narrow terms of the War on Terror 
binary, a binary which proceeds from the securitization of Islam. Within this opportunity 
structure, the Hashemite regime has attempted to harness and deploy the moral authority of a 
very narrow conception of ‘religion’ as a form of ‘productive power’ in order to place itself 
in a more advantageous global and regional position.
19
 Jordan has done this by playing on a 
myth of religious moderation which has resonated in the Middle East and the West since 
9/11.  This article focuses explicitly on the Jordanian side of the equation, illuminating an 
aspect of global politics which is far less well-known to Western audiences than US foreign 
policy towards the Middle East since 9/11.  
 
Moderation and ‘Brand Jordan’ 
In recent years critical scholars have analysed states’ ‘national branding’ strategies of 
public diplomacy, particularly those aimed at attracting foreign investment.
20
 However, states 
adopt brands for various objectives, and Jordan is a case in point. Here I follow Iğsiz’s 
conception of nation branding, which deploys Stoler’s ‘politics of comparison’.21 Nation 
branding in her view is a set of political moves by state officials to secure power in 
comparison to other states.
22
  
Historically, Western states have used the term ‘moderate’ as short-hand for Jordan’s 
pro-Western alignment. In turn, Jordan has promoted ‘moderation’ as an essential element of 
‘Brand Jordan’ in its diplomatic relations with them. When asked how they would describe 
Jordan’s moderate foreign policy position, the discourse of its elites was strikingly consistent: 
[it includes] building bridges, reaching out, avoiding radical views…we are realistic, more 
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objective in the region; ‘we are not ideologues’; it is ‘variation – putting everything out in the 
open – letting everyone speak – this is best’; ‘We don’t have enemies, we’re very tolerant, we 
don’t see things in black and white…this is a mature population. People want quiet and 
peaceful reform’.23 One Jordanian political analyst characterized moderation as being ‘close 
to the West, open to the outside world, pragmatic and dependent on other countries’.24 
However, elites also readily recognize the extent to which this is historically a pragmatic 
response to external pressures: instability on the borders with Syria and Iraq, dependence on 
Gulf powers and the West for economic support, additional Palestinian refugee flows. 
This domestic tenability of the brand hinges on an important paradox. As Aronczyk 
notes, nation branding is neither externally determined nor internally generated, but is the 
product of a dialectic between the population and elites.
25
 Varga also notes ‘nation branding 
cannot be successful without the participation of citizens who are at the same time 
representatives, stakeholders and consumers of the brand.’26 On the one hand, there is 
convergence between the regime, elite, and most of the population – particularly the middle 
class – about the paramount importance of stability, if not always the measures used to obtain 
that stability. If Jordanian political life was defined by decades of widespread violence in the 
streets, the outward-facing national brand as moderate would be domestically and 
internationally untenable. On the other hand, the picture is not entirely rosy. Historically, 
King Hussein, father of the current King, repeatedly used force to prevent coups and to 
prevent the Palestinians from forcing Jordan into war with Israel. In the wake of the 1970-1 
civil war, a delicate political balance was struck between East banker and Palestinian 
populations in Jordan: a ‘cold peace’, committed to nonviolence and to Hashemite rule. 
Working within the terms of the political liberalisation process which began in 1989, the 
main opposition Muslim Brotherhood followed suit, committing to nonviolent change and 
privileging stability.
27
 However Jordan has seen some violent protest from other political 
forces since 1989 over austerity measures, normalization with Israel, and the pace of reform. 
These prompted a swift, sharp, security response from the regime as recently as 2013. 
Jordan’s treatment of its political opponents has also periodically attracted criticism from 
international human rights bodies.
 
Critics of elite circles point to regime practices – the 
prosecution of protestors under anti-terrorism legislation, surveillance practices of the 
intelligence services (GID), curtailment of freedom of speech – as evidence that the regime’s 
claims to moderation are not the same as open-ness or political pluralism or liberal 
democracy. 
28
  
Still, that most Jordanians quietly and pragmatically support the monarchy cannot be 
analytically overlooked. This paradox can be explained in part by Jordan’s status as what 
Brumberg calls a ‘liberalized autocracy’, where Arab regimes uses ‘an adaptable ecology of 
repression, control and partial openness’, including the prospect of political reform, to 
prevent challenges to the status quo, similar in some ways to Shagan’s ‘apparent paradox’ of 
moderation.
29
 Non-regime actors adapt themselves to this environment to secure direct and 
indirect benefits from the regime, whether it be funding, patronage or simply political space 
to operate with less interference. Political quietism is simultaneously an honest choice and 
one which the regime tacitly and overtly incentivizes. Fieldwork revealed the extent to which 
the regime discourse of ‘moderation’ has infiltrated the discourse of supporters and 
opposition actors, to the extent which they are not fully conscious of themselves, in line with 
Lukes’ third dimension of power.30 Informants regularly pointed to the external threats 
Jordan has faced from Iraq and now Syria since 2003 and the post-Arab Spring brutality of 
many of its regional neighbours to justify their support for continuing Hashemite leadership, 
perhaps as a constitutional monarchy. 
5 
 
It is worth noting, however, that ‘moderation’ is not a large part of Jordan’s Arab-
facing national brand. Ryan has argued that Jordan has traditionally engaged in a small power 
strategy of ‘omnibalancing’ among its Arab neighbours, seeking alliances with powerful 
states while hoping not to attract the ire of others.
31
 Among Arab states Jordan has 
historically gained favour vis-à-vis its representation of the Palestinians and friendly 
engagement with its Ba’athist neighbours in Syria and Iraq. Its pro-Western stance has 
attracted suspicion and it has reaped no reputational benefits for making peace with Israel, 
from its Arab neighbours or its own population. Foreign policy pragmatism is characterized 
as practice rather than deep agreement. For example, one religious leader noted, ‘Jordan’s 
regional politics is about balance but that doesn’t mean you agree with everyone’.32  
The seeming coherence of the Western-facing brand begs the questions: where does 
Islamic moderation fit into this version of it, how and why? On that note, we turn to the 
Amman Messages of 2004 and 2007. 
 
The Amman messages: ‘moderate Islam’ and Jordanian foreign policy 
Varga has suggested that the external goal of nation branding goes beyond achieving 
finite foreign policy aims or securing foreign direct investment. Ultimate brand success is the 
creation of ‘popular ideas that people live by’, to create brands which ‘become tools in the 
factory of the social world that people use to create meaning and to build social 
environments’, echoing what Barnett and Duvall call ‘productive power’.33 Since 2004 the 
Hashemite regime has voiced large ambitions: to change negative Western narratives about 
Islam, promote peaceful global exchange on the basis of religious ethics and values, and for 
moderation, particularly religious moderation, to shape the foreign and domestic policies of 
other Arab Middle Eastern states  
Their primary vehicles for this has been the Amman Message and related dialogue 
activities. The Amman Message began as a sermon delivered by Jordan’s chief justice, 
Sheikh Iz al-Din al-Tamimi at Amman’s al-Hashimiyyin mosque on Laylat al-Qadr, 9 
November 2004. Initiated and endorsed by King Abdullah II, it claims to represent the 
‘historical, universal and unanimous religious and political consensus (ijma‘) of the Ummah 
(nation) of Islam in our day, and a consolidation of traditional, orthodox Islam’. Following 
Tamimi’s original statement, the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought posed three 
questions to 24 senior scholars in the region to delineate the ‘true nature of Islam’: Who is a 
Muslim? Is it permissible to declare someone an apostate (takfir)? Who has the right to issue 
a fatwa (legal ruling)? Their responses are summed up in three points. First, it defines a 
Muslim as someone who adheres to one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence or 
one of two Shi‘i schools. It also recognises the legitimacy of the Ibadi, Thahiri and Ash‘ari 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic mysticism (Sufism), and ‘true’ Salafism. Second, it 
states that any person who adheres to any of these schools of law cannot be declared takfir 
(an apostate). Third, it declares that only qualified muftis may issue fatwas and only within 
the interpretative boundaries of the eight madhahib (schools of jurisprudence).
34
 It has so far 
garnered 552 signatories in 84 countries and remains open for endorsement.  
 While the Amman Message is intra-Islamic in focus, a 2007 follow-up message, A 
Common Word between Us and You was directed towards Christian scholars around the 
world.
35
 The 29-page document which began as an open letter from 138 prominent Muslims, 
both Sunni and Shi‘a, argues that ‘the future of the world depends on peace between Muslims 
and Christians’.36 However, notably, the Amman Message has been more prominently 
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deployed by the Jordanians in the global political context, to both Western civilian 
policymakers and military personnel. 
Though its efforts to establish a global profile in this area are recent, Jordan’s 
interfaith activities date to the early 1990s.  In 1994, Prince El Hassan bin Talal, the former 
Crown Prince, established two institutions: the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic 
Thought and the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies (RIIFS).
37
 From 1994-2004, Jordan’s 
support for interfaith dialogue was ‘meant to support [the Israeli/Palestinian] political process 
to create a better climate for peace’.38 Since 2004, under the auspices of the Amman 
Messages, Jordan’s efforts to promote moderate Islam shifted to ostensibly to provide a 
counter-weight to salafist and jihadist voices in the region and to educate the West about the 
variety of Islamic experience, particularly of nonviolence. The European Union has funded 
RIIFS efforts to promote the Amman message in in Europe and the Middle East since early 
2013.  (One interviewee noted that this was at Europe’s instigation rather than Jordan’s.) A 
steady hum of activity from civil society and from Prince Hassan and Prince Ghazi has 
included a significant number of conferences and meetings among scholars. World Interfaith 
Harmony week was established following an UN resolution proposed in 2010 by King 
Abdullah II and Prince Ghazi. 
The two ‘Amman Messages’ are part of broader trajectories in Jordanian domestic 
politics. The 1991 National Charter set out the national identity and parameters for the state’s 
democratic evolution defined Jordanian identity broadly as Arab and Islamic, and subsequent 
efforts to define the nation followed suit. Official efforts to define and monopolize what 
counts as legitimate, ‘moderate Islam’ play upon the Hashemites’ descent from the Prophet. 
However, as Adely notes, Jordanian society contains multiple competing social and political 
projects to define what counts as Islamic orthodoxy.
39
 These multiple projects include those 
institutionalised groups who refuse to participate in democracy (Hizb al-Tahrir, the traditional 
Salafists, jihadist Salafists and da‘wa groups) and those who do (Islamic Action Front, Du‘a 
party, and the Wasat party) as well as looser, piety movements and practices.
40
 The state 
vision (din al-dawla) is not all-encompassing and is entangled with, problematized and 
accommodated by actors representing myriad vernacular conceptions of Islam (din al-milla).
 
41
  Kabatilo notes that the state promotes a vision of Islam ‘which fit[s] in with its nation-
building project, such as celebrating religious ceremonies, hospitality, loyalty and honour’, 
while the Islamists promote ones like veiling and banning alcohol which set them apart from 
the state and allow them to criticize it.
42
 Since the 1950s, the regime has closely monitored 
and sought to control religious public spaces, religious education in public and private 
institutions and preaching in the mosques to prevent any threats to the regime.
43
 All mosques, 
preachers and religious functionaries in Jordan are under the purview of the Ministry of 
Religious Endowments and Holy Places, and there has been a gradual bureaucratization and 
state co-option of Islam, culminating in a 1986 royal edict declaring state control and 
monitoring over all religious instruction in schools and preaching in the kingdom’s 
mosques.
44
 
Browers and Adely have both explored the more divisive features of the Amman 
Message.
45
 They argue that the 2004 Message has helped undermine the claims of the 
opposition Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front and other groups with 
religious mandates which have flourished since the Islamic Revival in the region, with knock 
on effects for pluralism, democratization and reform.
46
 Particularly since the start of the 
‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, the Hashemites have deployed this discourse domestically to fend off 
challenges from a rising tide of social conservatism in Jordan, expounded by the tribes and 
the Islamists. Instrumentally, but perhaps more positively, the Amman Messages have also 
been used by elites to send a message to the Christian minority in Jordan. This minority 
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occupies a disproportionate number of leadership positions within the private sector and 
holds approximately 45% of the country’s private wealth. With the mass migration of 
Christians from the region following wars in Iraq and Syria, the Hashemites have been keen 
to emphasize to Jordanian Christians the historic protection they have enjoyed in the 
Kingdom, to stem the flight of private sector capital and skilled workers. 
Fieldwork revealed that while the 2004 Message was promoted domestically in 
schools and to imams, its promotion has gradually taken on a more outward-facing character 
over the course of 10 years. Though the Hashemites stress that the Amman Messages are 
primarily for regional and intra-Islamic consumption, they have an obvious, and more 
attentive, Western audience. In interviews with the author, several Jordanian political 
officials and religious leaders quietly admitted that the Amman Messages have had political 
advantages beyond their original intention, though they were reticent to expand on those. A 
former senior diplomat and former director of the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, when 
asked what the Amman message accomplished politically, replied ‘nothing…it was 
soothing’. He noted that Jordan has continued to engage in interreligious dialogue activity 
since 1994 because ‘it does not conflict with [our] political interests’.47 Another former 
government minister called the Amman Messages a ‘media gimmick’ by elites which was 
‘lost in translation’ for the rest of the population.48 
Taking up Browers’ prompt, the rest of the article explores the Messages role in 
deepening Jordanian relations with the West, particularly the US, and the economic, political 
and security benefits Jordan has accrued. The Amman Messages are only one aspect of the 
Jordanian ‘national brand’, of which moderation is one part, and of which Islam is only one 
facet. However, Jordan’s branding as moderately Islamic and supportive of interfaith 
dialogue has proved critical to building political trust with the West. This is due to its 
coherence with a myth of religious moderation which has become particularly salient in 
Middle Eastern and Western state relations since 9/11. 
 
The War on Terror and the myths of religious moderation and mosaic 
 William Cavanaugh has argued that Western political traditions have tended to 
associate religion, particularly non-Christian religion, with violence: a ‘myth of religious 
violence’.49 This myth, he suggests, is a product of European history, particularly the 
emergence of the nation state from the ashes of the so-called ‘Wars of Religion’ and post-
Enlightenment, secularization processes. However, he argues, this myth has also conditioned 
Western relations with others, most recently the Middle East. Related to this, many critical 
scholars of religion have demonstrated that a modality of imperial relations between West 
and non-West in the sixteenth through the late nineteenth centuries was the codification and 
designation of a series of cultural practices as ‘religion’ but also as barbaric, potentially 
violent, and inferior to Christianity.
50
 Part of the European colonial mechanism, they argue, 
was to ‘civilize’ and govern these practices into something that looked more like 
(‘nonviolent’) Christianity or to directly orchestrate conversions to Christianity. These 
‘civilizing’ practices were, I suggest, the other side of the coin, a myth of religious 
moderation, which is the product of the same historical trajectory Cavanaugh describes. It 
rests on the same false premises but has similar persuasive force, repeated even by those who 
are sceptical of it for political ends. Appleby has argued persuasively that religious traditions 
are double-edged, with both violent and irenic tendencies.
 51
 It should perhaps not come as a 
surprise then that both ‘religion’s’ violent and irenic tendencies would be mythologized.  
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In Europe, as religion was cordoned off to the private sphere post-Enlightenment, 
over a period of several centuries it gradually became associated in the European imaginary 
with interior belief, then civility, then femininity in the twentieth century and finally, in the 
last three decades of the twentieth century, with civil society. During the late twentieth 
century, in order to relate to the structures of liberal democratic governance, religious actors 
had to organise themselves as interest groups, speak the language of secular politics,
52
 defend 
their interests as social and ethical rather than political, and market their progressive and 
nonviolent credentials. In short, participation in the democratic process in the West after the 
Second World War has required that actors convincingly perform ‘religious moderation’.  
This performance of religious moderation has become particularly visible and 
institutionalised in global politics since the turn of the millennium, facilitated by the salience 
of Islam to the so-called War on Terror. It is the wider organising frame for what Hurd calls 
the ‘restoration narrative’ in Western foreign policy and IR.53 She argues:  
‘The basic assumption animating this restorative turn…is that once religious 
moderates are understood, engaged and empowered, and religious fundamentalists 
identified, side lined or reformed, the problems posed by religion will lessen and 
religious freedom will spread across the globe.
54
 
Hurd argues that ‘a rising tide of international legal and administrative initiatives, policies 
and campaigns’ depend on an assumed distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ religion, where 
the former can be harnessed for ‘the global public good’. This is evident, she suggests, in a 
variety of Western public policies and programmes, including those promoting religious 
freedom,  democratisation, human rights, good governance, transitional justice, foreign aid, 
emergency relief, counter-terrorism, peace-building, humanitarian intervention and nation-
building.
55
  
Though Hurd specifically addresses Western policy, practice and attitudes, it is 
important to note that the global performance of religious moderation is a dialectic between 
Western actors beholden to the restoration narrative and those – in the non-West and the 
West – who seek to capitalize on structural opportunities provided by it. The myth of 
religious moderation is a shared organising frame and interfaith dialogue has been framed by 
it. In 2000, in response to Samuel Huntington’s post-Cold War ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, 
Iranian President Khatami called for a global Dialogue of Civilizations.
56
 After September 
11
th
, efforts at intergovernmental, national and local levels have focused on the imagined axis 
between the so-called ‘West’ and ‘Islamic world’. Though ‘moderation’ has often been 
flagged by Western policymakers, scholars and civil society as a precondition for non-
Western dialogue partners,
57
 the thin criteria for what constitutes moderation is more often 
implied than articulated: a nonviolent, non-radical, non-rejectionist stance towards Western 
(usually US) foreign policies and a non-hostile stance towards Israel. At the same time 
Western governments have sometimes found the nuance of what counts as moderation or 
centrism in the Middle East difficult to grasp. For example, Lynch has noted Western 
resistance to seeing as moderate socially conservative Muslim voices such as Sheikh Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi as a barrier to dialogue.
58
  
Calling upon the myth of religious moderation, proponents of intercultural dialogue 
stress the universal irenic resources in religions and cultures for building peace. Western 
policy circles see it as a useful string to the diplomatic bow.
59
 However, critics question the 
view that intercultural dialogue is an unproblematic supplementary mechanism for norm 
advocacy, such as the promotion of human rights. In IR, Jackson has noted that a dialogue of 
civilizations is an ‘unstable’ arrangement, which threatens to collapse into ‘one of the more 
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stable alternatives’: cultural superiority or ‘thoroughly depoliticized aesthetic rituals like 
ethnic food festivals’.60 The Economist put the limitations more bluntly: ‘Set-piece meetings 
among robed gentlemen (and a few long-suffering ladies) won’t by themselves solve the 
world’s problems, or even the world’s inter-religious strains’.61 Dialogue can privilege and 
valorise some voices, while side lining others, such as dissenters and women. It can give the 
appearance of false pluralism, reify ‘tradition’, collapse hybridity and nuance, and police the 
boundaries of orthodox practice and identity. It may give the false appearance of consultation 
and equal partnership to distract from state political and economic policies. It may also 
reinforce the secular boundary that ‘religion’ is/should be concerned with social life not 
politics. 
This line of critique, while relatively new for analysts of global politics, echoes long-
standing reservations among theologians that ecumenical and interfaith dialogue emphasizes 
commonality while silencing dissenting voices and points of theological, legal and ethical 
impasse. Further, some have noted the particular distortive effects of the War on Terror and a 
US push for democratic reform in the Middle East on global interfaith dialogue.
62
 State-
supported interfaith or intercultural dialogue also unfortunately sits within a palette of 
‘structural power’ security and diplomatic strategies by the US and its Western allies63 – the 
U.S. Human Terrain System and the British iteration, the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit – 
which have attempted to capitalize on religion and culture for strategic advantage. 
Certainly the picture is far from straight-forward. Civil society actors – Muslim and 
otherwise – in the West and the Middle East have capitalized on opportunities to manoeuvre 
themselves into positions of international and domestic influence vis-á-vis other groups or to 
genuinely develop their community’s political and social capacity, often from a position of 
structural disadvantage.
64
 Interfaith dialogue has become a ‘community of practice’ which 
transcends the intergovernmental, governmental and sub-state levels and has brought these 
three levels into engagement.
65
 This has allowed quieter voices to exercise normative 
persuasion over more powerful actors.  
However, regimes in Muslim-majority states have also used their participation in 
global interfaith dialogue to deflect international pressure to institute political reform or 
recognise human rights, including religious rights. What counts as ‘interfaith dialogue’ has no 
fixed or consolidated meaning, for scholars or practitioners. Therefore it is open to 
appropriation and manipulation by actors. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates are examples. Saudi Arabia has funded the Vienna-based King Abdullah bin 
Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue since 2012.
66
 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also been involved in the funding of projects for 
interfaith dialogue, the former through the Doha International Centre for Interfaith Dialogue, 
established in May 2008. This stands in stark contrast to their human rights records. States 
have also used their participation to co-opt political space from their opposition movements. 
For example, former Iranian President Khatami’s efforts to promote a Dialogue of 
Civilizations agenda at UN level ‘provided [him] with “propaganda points” to use against his 
domestic opposition and the United States’.67 Dialogue is also a vehicle for states to intrude 
upon long-standing scholarly debates over who holds Islamic authority in the Sunni and Shi‘a 
worlds. 
Critically, the myth of religious moderation has its own genealogy in the Arab world 
and is not a Western import. The Levantine equivalent is reference to the ‘mosaic’, of 
multiple religious, ethnic and nationalist minorities living in peace with each other and with 
the Arab, Sunni majority. It is used to claim Levantine authority on interfaith and inter-
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communal dialogue. This ‘myth of the mosaic’ collapses a complicated history of 
dhimmitude under Ottoman rule, washes over the unequal treatment of religious, ethnic and 
national minorities in contemporary states, inter-communal civil war in Lebanon, Iraq and 
Syria, a turbulent history of Jewish settlement in the Levant and the unequal treatment of 
women and the poor. The indigeneity and authenticity of the mosaic is claimed by Levantine 
actors in Jordan and Lebanon who compete with other, better-funded competitors in the field 
of interfaith dialogue such as Saudi Arabia the UAE and Qatar.  
The myth of the mosaic is based on elements of truth but can be delineated from 
cosmopolitan conviviality found in many urban centres in the Middle East. While I remain 
deeply sceptical of state practices, following Roy, I also leave open the possibility of being 
able to designate analytically between states’ instrumental invocation of ‘moderate Islam’ 
and the everyday, convivial, often paradoxical practices of religious pluralism in Middle 
Eastern societies.
68
 The next section interrogates how the convergence of the Western myth 
of religious moderation and the Levantine myth of the mosaic have helped to facilitate 
Jordanian-US political trust. 
 
Political trust in US-Jordanian relations  
In recent years IR scholars have teased out political trust as more than the outcome of 
rational calculations of interests.
69
 Rathbun distinguishes between strategic trust (calculation 
of interests) and generalized and particularized varieties of moralistic trust (an overall 
assessment of the integrity and character of the partner).
70
 Michel has expanded on this, 
building on Lahno’s account of the role of emotion in trust.71 Michel notes that a large 
component of political trust is ‘a non-representational, inarticulate and moralistic disposition 
which structures our perception of others in our environment’.72  Trust as a disposition is not 
the product of a ‘conscious, reflexive decision-making process’ but instead ‘precedes rational 
decision-making’.73 Trust is, he thinks, the product of ‘pragmatic, phronetic’ knowledge 
gained through shared experience over time. Michel does not address material power, and the 
disparities are crucial to understanding the ebbs and flows of political trust between the US 
and Jordan. However, his conception is useful for illuminating two things: first, the 
importance of US perceptions of Jordan as moderate in sustaining political trust between 
them over time and second, the subtle, facilitative role of ‘religion’ in deepening US-
Jordanian political trust after 9/11. 
In November 1957 King Hussein asked bluntly: ‘does the US trust and believe in 
Jordan or not?’74 Over the course of six decades, the answer has varied. Though Jordanian 
political elites like to claim an unbroken alliance with the US, from the end of the British 
Mandate to the present, the history is complex. Since 1957, the US has used economic and 
military aid, the CIA and the Sixth Fleet to support the regime, which they understood as 
critical to preventing the spread of radical threats to Israel and the free flow of oil.
75
 However 
King Hussein’s brief 1967 pact with Nasser and periodic flirtation with the Soviets during the 
1960s to extract further US military and economic aid harmed US relations.
76
 However, US 
policy circles still considered Jordan to be moderate even during this tumultuous period. 
President John F. Kennedy characterized it as ‘a buffer state with a moderate government’ led 
by ‘a young, beleaguered fellow’ caught in ‘a race against time’.77 Despite his sometime 
intransigence, King Hussein was considered a critical bulwark against rising tides of 
Nasserist and Ba’athist nationalism, as well as Soviet influence. US-Jordanian relations were 
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solidified through US support to King Hussein during the 1970-1 Black September war with 
the Palestinian Fedayeen.  
During the 1970s and 1980s Jordan played an important role in the Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process, despite periodic friction between the US and Jordan.
78
 During the Iran-Iraq War 
Jordan was an intermediary between Saddam Hussein and the US. King Hussein was angry at 
learning that the US and Israel had sold arms to Iran, prompting President Reagan to write 
‘our relationship has always been one of deep trust and nothing must change that’.79 
Relations suffered a more serious blow during the 1990-1 Gulf War when King Hussein 
declined to distance himself from Saddam Hussein and align fully with the US-led coalition. 
The US decision to cut off aid was only rescinded in 1994 with the signing of the Wadi Araba 
treaty with Israel. 
Using Rathbun’s distinction between strategic and generalized, moralistic trust, we 
can say that the period since 1994 is one of not only increasing strategic trust but also 
deepening generalized trust between Jordan and the US and Europe.
80
 Between the 1992 
Madrid conference where Jordan led the Palestinian delegation and the 1994 Wadi Araba 
treaty with Israel, Jordan established itself as a ‘partner for peace’ in US eyes and was 
designated a major non-NATO ally in 1996. During the period 1991-2001 the US also 
pressured the Hashemites to collaborate with the CIA-allied Iraqi opposition, particularly 
Kurdish groups. Kings Hussein and Abdullah II tried to steer a middle position between US 
pressure and population sympathies for Saddam Hussein, who had provided 50% of Jordan’s 
oil supplies for free. Iraq was the main market for Jordanian goods and Jordan was the first to 
break the international embargo against trade and aid to Iraq at the end of the 1990s.  
On the eve of 9/11, King Abdullah II had been in power one year when various 
overlapping crises hit. This included the collapse of the Oslo process on its western border; 
the threat of a US war with Iraq on its eastern border; and the internal pressures of an 
economic liberalization process. Relations with the US intensified almost immediately after 
9/11 and took on a different character, with Washington more dependent on Amman’s active 
cooperation than at any other point in history. Michel calls this ‘reliance’, a willingness to 
cooperate based on shared interests.
81
 Jordanian intelligence had particular expertise on the 
Arab Afghans, because many Jordanian jihadists went to Afghanistan during the 1980s and 
1990s and its intelligence services had infiltrated jihadist groups. In the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11 the deputy chief of the CIA and other high-level officials went to Amman to talk 
about coordinating efforts. In recognition of its contribution, the US-Jordan Free Trade 
agreement, negotiated in 1995, was ratified in December 2001 (though not fully implemented 
until 2010). Jordan also became one of the top US aid recipients nearly immediately after it 
announced its support for the US invasion of Afghanistan. 
Iraq was, however, a different matter given significant popular support for Saddam. 
Jordan was pulled in two directions by its extensive economic ties to Iraq and the US. In a 
2002 meeting, King Abdullah II angered President George W. Bush with his strong stance 
against invasion. Jordan eventually softened its position, allowing Patriot missile batteries to 
be stationed on the border. Though not publicly acknowledged by the regime, Jordanian 
analysts familiar with this period said that Jordanian intelligence was also involved in 
recruiting Iraqis already in Jordan to the US cause and US special forces also entered Iraq 
through Jordan for clandestine operations prior to the invasion. In the words of one 
interviewee: ‘This wasn’t charity. We would have to live with the problem once the 
Americans left’.  
12 
 
However, over the course of the decade, relations between the US and Jordan 
strengthened further from what Michel calls reliance to trust.
82
 After the 2005 Al Qaeda 
attacks on central Amman hotels, organised by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the head of Al Qaeda 
in Iraq and a Jordanian, cooperation with the US intensified. Journalists interviewed noted 
that Jordan engaged in considerable information gathering in Iraq on the Sunni resistance and 
Al Qaeda. However it is also said that they ‘flirted’ with the Iraqi resistance because they 
wanted them to counter Iranian influence in Iraq. While officially Jordan provided hospital 
equipment in Afghanistan, the extent of Jordanian intelligence cooperation there was revealed 
with the death of eight intelligence agents in Khost, Afghanistan in 2009, of whom was a 
relative of the King.  
Where do the Amman Messages and related interfaith activities fit into this story? 
How has Jordan’s invocation of the Levantine myth of the mosaic and the Western myth of 
religious moderation facilitated Jordan’s efforts to build generalized political trust with the 
West? The Hashemites have come to use the Amman Messages as a calling card to the West, 
a way to grease the wheels of increased security and political cooperation. One example of 
this is how the Amman Messages have enhanced Jordan’s credibility with Western and other 
Arab militaries. The former army mufti and current Supreme Mufti noted that the US army 
was ‘very interested’ in the Amman message and it was ‘common’ for it to be discussed. For 
example, in 2009 Jordanian army imams went to Egypt during Eager Lion, the joint military 
exercise with the US, and had a meeting with participating soldiers. Jordanian imams also 
cooperated with the Afghan National Army and US personnel stationed in Afghanistan. In 
2008 there were several exchanges between Jordanian imams and the US army chaplaincy, 
including a meeting with the US National Security Advisor with responsibility for the Middle 
East. However, the Supreme Mufti noted that in his view American chaplains’ knowledge of 
Islam was ‘very superficial’ and ad hoc; by contrast Jordanian muftis were far better 
informed about Christianity. Jordanian imams also advised Swiss, Saudi, British and Kuwaiti 
military personnel on Islamic moderation and combatting extremism. The Supreme Mufti 
noted that ‘Jordanians have become a reference for anyone who wants to fight extremism’, 
and that Jordan ‘is now the foremost country in spreading moderate Islam’. He noted King 
Abdullah’s speech before the US congress in 2007 as evidence of how Jordan is regarded as a 
credible speaker.  
As the Amman Messages have gained traction in the West, Western states and civil 
society have in turn promoted Jordan as moderate and as moderately Islamic. For example, a 
November 2013 article in Al Shorfa (a PR tool of US Central Command) on Jordan’s efforts 
to contain Al Qaeda emphasized its efforts to ‘promote common ground and peace among the 
various religions and sects in the Middle East’, highlighting the Amman message, World 
Interfaith Harmony Week and A Common Word.
83
 Congressional resolutions have 
commended Jordan as ‘a leader for progress and tolerance in the Arab world’ and the reign of 
King Abdullah II as ‘enlightened’.84 In a 2008 speech, President Obama praised the King’s 
‘example of moderation and modernization’.85 In a 2010 speech on security cooperation with 
Mediterranean countries the Secretary General of NATO called it ‘a remarkable and strong 
message…a solid foundation for cooperation and partnerships across political, cultural and 
religious borders for the benefit of peace and humanity’.86 
The direct impact of the Amman Messages and related dialogue activities on US-
Jordanian and EU-Jordanian relations is difficult to quantify and should not be overestimated. 
However, Jordan’s discourse of moderation has successfully permeated Western diplomatic 
discourse with diplomats regularly emphasizing ‘shared values’ alongside interests. For 
example, one Amman-based Western diplomat describing King Abdullah II as ‘one of us…a 
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mid-Atlantic king who increasingly shares our worldview’. A senior American diplomat 
similarly articulated a perceived symmetry between the Hashemites and the West as a matter 
not merely of interests but of deeply shared values: ‘our values are synonymous; their values 
are our values’. While Hashemite elites are Westernized, the extent to which liberal 
democracies and at best partially democratized Jordan whose monarchy faces loud calls by 
tribal and Islamist forces for fuller participation share ‘synonymous values’ is an open 
question. However this attitude is an important part of the political landscape.
87
 Structural 
and material explanations only illuminate a relationship of mutual ‘reliance’ based on 
interests.
88
 They cannot make good sense of comments like ‘their values are our values’. In 
interviews, Western diplomats and civil society actors regularly referenced the Amman 
Message as important evidence for this connection.  
Several factors have moved relations beyond mutual reliance to more generalized 
political trust since the 2010 Arab revolutions. Some of these are structural: the instability of 
key partners like Egypt and Bahrain, and Jordan’s relative political and economic stability 
despite rising waves of unrest in the region and civil war in Iraq and Syria. Four regional 
factors have both revealed what a trusted ally small Jordan has become and have continued to 
raise Jordan’s profile as a ‘moderate’ state. First, King Abdullah II was a key confidant to 
Secretary of State John Kerry, seen as a positive influence on Fatah during the 2013 round of 
peace talks. Second, the collapse of Egypt as a security partner after the July 2013 army coup 
prompted the elevation of Jordan and Kuwait as US security partners. The move of the joint 
US-Arab security exercise, now called Eager Lion, to Jordan in 2012 is evidence of this, as is 
Jordan’s participation in coalition action against Islamic State. Third, King Abdullah II is 
seen by Western powers as a moderate among the Arab voices needed to secure broad 
consent for a final international nuclear agreement with Iran. And fourth, Jordan’s absorption 
of Syrian refugees has won it praise in the West. The international donor Friends of Syria 
conference was held in Amman in summer 2013 as was the World Economic Forum, and 
Secretary of State Kerry visited multiple times. However, Jordan’s success cannot merely be 
ascribed to its diplomatic skill. Geography has played a significant role in persuading the US 
of its critical importance. Jordan has found itself situated between four states of critical 
import to US strategy in the region: between, as King Abdullah famously put it, ‘Iraq and a 
hard place’ to its east and west, and between a member of the so-called ‘Axis of Evil’ to the 
north and the state most critical to US energy security to the south. 
In recent years US aid to Jordan has continued to increase as a Jordanian economic 
crisis continued to deepen. In 2008 Jordan and the US signed a 5 year memorandum of 
understanding to provide $3.6 and $3 million respectively in budgetary and military support. 
The US surpassed the EU as the primary donor during this period. While the EU (then EC) 
has provided economic support to Jordan since 1978, including budgetary support, it has also 
applied consistent pressure on political reform, civil society development and human rights, 
arguably more so than the US.
89
 While relations with the EU are close – it has been one of 
Jordan’s largest trading partners since the 1980s – it is still somewhat qualitatively different 
from its US relationship during the 9/11 wars.  
Has Jordanian promotion of moderate Islam and ‘interfaith harmony’ been a part of 
its ‘bandwagoning’, with the US?90 Or is it a form of balancing, speaking the language of 
religious moderation to the West while promoting its Islamic authority among its 
neighbours?
91
 Moving beyond this debate in the small state literature, Browning argues that 
smallness is not a given but a construct, that ‘smallness can be told in different ways’.92 In the 
case of the Amman Messages, being small is constructed by Jordan as ‘a claim to morality, 
legitimacy and the right to speak out on international issues’.93 The Amman Messages are 
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one facet of the regime’s attempts at what Chong calls ‘virtual enlargement’.94 One former 
foreign minister noted, ‘It is part of the outreach of Jordan. You called it soft power and I like 
that. I think it’s very, very aptly put’.95 In the words of another former foreign minister: ‘we 
are small so we do what we can’ to have an influence in global politics and in the region.96 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a calling card, the Amman Messages have helped to facilitate cooperation with the 
West, particularly security cooperation, through the joint performance of ‘moderate shared 
values’. This performance has helped to move the US-Jordanian relationship and, to a lesser 
extent, the European-Jordanian relationships beyond mere reliance to political trust, which 
Michel argues has an emotional component.
97
 The Amman Messages have had productive 
power because they seemed to policymakers to create a diplomatic ‘space apart’ where realist 
power calculations need not dominate but where states and societies could work together in a 
framework of trust, stability, generous goodwill, and hope towards higher human good. The 
notion that there can ever be ‘space apart’ from power and politics is a category mistake. 
However, this category mistake rests on the inherent paradox of religion. Poggi has argued, 
following Weber, that religion’s social power derives from its ability to provide meaning and 
value-direction and to compel human action through emotive moral appeal, allowing it to 
influence political and economic life.
98
 Paradoxically, this leaves it both open to political 
manipulation but also makes it a potent force for resistance in global politics.
 99
 
Beyond an empirical focus on Islam and the Middle East, this article has attempted to 
bring moderation conceptually into dialogue with the social constructivist literatures in IR on 
nation branding and political trust. However, a more theoretically- and empirically-informed, 
critical account of moderation has the potential to illuminate an array of practices in global 
politics, contributing to the broader social constructivist literature on foreign policy, 
informing scholarship on power, identity, negotiations, state and non-state alliance building 
international law, norm diffusion, nuclear proliferation, democratization, global trade, 
humanitarianism, and also on non-state transnational activism. This particular case suggests 
the need to look carefully at the social construction of moderate identity in foreign and 
domestic policy, not least as a part of ‘culture as display’, because this display may mask 
authoritarian and anti-democratic practices or may have more monologic characteristics than 
dialogic
 
.
100
 Moderation also has much broader potential as a theoretical starting point 
through which to think through liberalism as a paradigm in IR theory, which relies heavily on 
a latent, under-theorised notion of moderate practice in global politics. 
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